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American Trial Films and the Popular Culture of Law
By Jessica Silbey
The legal trial has been central to the United States’ public sphere since the country’s founding.
Transparent justice was a critical governmental reform of the new nation, and the public trial
with its commitment to more evenhanded representation for both sides of the dispute reinforced
the promise of justice for all. Even before national independence, the famous trials of the Boston
Massacre, where Captain Preston, four British soldiers and several Bostonian civilians stood
trial for murder, were hallmarks of equal justice to be witnessed by the New England
community. John Adams and Josiah Quincy, still both young lawyers, defended the accused
against the charges amid an incendiary climate of revolution. The New England community
witnessed two local leaders, whose personal and political interests lay with the Sons of Liberty
and not the British, heroically marshal the rules of law and insist on their fair application to
successful acquittals. John Adams famously said that his defense at the trials of the Boston
Massacre was
one of the most gallant, generous, manly and disinterested Actions of my whole
Life, and one of the best Pieces of Service I ever rendered my Country.
Judgment of Death against those Soldiers would have been as foul a Stain upon
this Country as the Executions of the Quakers or Witches, anciently
(Corbly, 2009, pp. 213–214).
Although not all public trials were previously fair or just, as the Salem trials in Adams’s quote
references, the new nation’s commitments to transparency, evenhandedness, and equal justice
was evident in its early events, writings, and the representations of those events.
The public trial was (and remains) an opportunity to educate people about law and justice, about
the basic commitments to the rule of law, and to provide people (through jury service and
witness testimony) the opportunity to participate in the system and rendering of judgment.
Through participation, citizens take responsibility for communal judgment and a political system
that decrees and enforces civil and criminal liability by participating in the decision making that
inflicts both. More than two centuries later, the United States remains as committed to open
courthouses and access to justice as ever, although the struggle for equal justice evolves as our
cultural norms of and barriers to equality and freedom change (Resnik & Curtis, 2011). Whereas
at the founding, concerns over equal justice revolved around political allegiances, and
preferences were strong for local community members as against “outsiders,” today that
struggle includes more complex dimensions that revolve around diverse identities and a
commitment to inclusivity that includes class, race, gender, sexual orientation, and national
origin.
Despite shifting grounds for equal access claims, the place of the public trial has not diminished
in the United States. It is a focal point for debates about individual and national issues, both
between discrete parties and about systemic wrongs and institutional challenges. Consider that
a single criminal trial may be about the culpability for the death of a person as much as about
policing practices (racial profiling, coerced confessions, or injuries caused when apprehending
suspects), racial and gendered hierarchies (when race or sex differences are part of the
underlying facts of the case), and justifiable defenses (such as self-defense or accident). The
public courtroom trial is an opportunity to debate issues that animate our cultural identities as
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society members: we are free but remain accountable and responsible for one another’s welfare
through democratic processes structured through law.
So it is no surprise that our public courtroom trial is a common feature of our popular cultural
forms: books, magazines, radio, film, television, and varied visual arts. Paul Revere’s engraving
of the Boston Massacre [Insert 1], produced weeks after the event, was considered one of the
most effective forms of pro-independence communications that shaped public opinion (some
call it “propaganda,” as its purpose was to persuade—it is not an accurate depiction of the
events and was accompanied by a poem credited to Revere).

Figure 1. Paul Revere’s Engraving of the Boston Massacre
Newspaper accounts of sensational trials were in high demand, as evidenced by contemporary
readership and response to the reporting, which started as early as the Reconstruction. One
such magazine, called Day’s Doings, was founded in June 1868 and was devoted to “current
events of romance, police reports, important trials, and sporting news.” (Mott, 1938, p. 44) Other
forms of popular legal news reporting included serialized radio coverage and editorial cartoons
(see Insert 2 below of Carey Orr cartoon from the Chicago Tribune in reference to the 1925
case of Tennessee v. Scopes). Popular press coverage spilled over into the streets, drawing
crowds at the courthouses such as the one pictured below in response to the Loeb-Leopold
case. (Larson, 2008)
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Figure 2. Carey Orr cartoon, Chicago Tribune, 1925

Figure 3. Photograph from outside courthouse in Chicago during Loeb-Leopold trial
These popular cultural representations of law and justice reinforce the legal trial’s own
ideological commitments—public scrutiny as a measure to ensure democratic accountability—
especially as the popular cultural forms themselves are idealized, simplified, and rendered
iconographic over time. The lawyer-hero or crusading attorney, the villain-judge or mob jury, the
jury-as-liberator or “blind” (independent) judge, and the trial-as-mystery “whodunit,” are
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expected tropes in the popular forms of the courtroom drama in American culture. These
popular forms and the stories they tell about the relationship between our legal systems and the
citizens accountable to it reinforce everyday beliefs about law and justice in society. As Naomi
Mezey writes, quoting from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks: “Culture deeply informs our
common-sense assumptions, and . . . common sense is at once a product of the culture in
which we live and a form of ideology. It is ‘the conception of the world which is uncritically
absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the
average man is developed’” (Mezey, 2015, p. 41).

The Trial Film: A History of Film and Law
The courtroom drama, or “trial film,” is one of the original genres of American film, dating from
1907, only a decade after the birth of cinema (Clover, 1998, p. 259; Silbey, 2007, p. 131). The
visual dramatic narrative form of the trial is now also widely experienced on television, be it
fictionalized (e.g., Law and Order [NBC, 1990 to present]), The Good Wife (CBS, 2009–2016),
in “reality” as courtroom television (The People’s Court[1981 to 1993], Judge Judy [1996 to
present]), or with cameras in the courtroom (the first televised trial being of the rape trial of the
New Bedford Six, which was made into the 1988 film The Accused) (Carr, 1989; Rangel, 1984;
Silbey, 2009, p. 61). Telling legal stories through moving pictures is commonplace now given
the ubiquity of cameras and the image-dominance of our culture and information transmission.
But even from the earliest days of film, law was a focus of the cinematic narrative—with its
climax in the courtroom trial. Viewers (experiencing the story as jurors and judges) were and
continue to be pulled to participate in the critical decision making of the trial through the special
relationship that film creates through its viewing. Indeed, the legal trial is particularly well suited
to representation in and through film because the trial film combines the authoritative
mechanisms of film with law, both of which are grounded in the confidence of the individual
viewer (or “witness”) to attest to the world as they see it or “know” it.
The American courtroom trial and the art of cinema share epistemological approaches that
contribute to their mutual dominance in popular culture. Both stake claims to an authoritative
form of knowledge based on the indubitable quality of observable phenomena. And both
proceed through narrative devices (telling and retellings from multiple perspectives) that sustain
the authority of visual perception by increasing the self-awareness of viewers and witnesses to
the contingencies of the stories being told. And yet most films, trial films included, play on the
problem of knowing through sight. When audiences watch film, they are aware that they are not
“seeing” reality unfold before them; they are seeing a story being told or reenacted through
images and sound. And yet their experience of the film is as if the events were happening in
front of their eyes. This is cinema’s pleasure and its magic (Bazin, 1967, pp. 13–14). This
experience of oscillation between reality and representation emboldens viewers to feel as if they
know the difference. Films often reveal their own storytelling mechanisms—special effects,
flashbacks, multiple points of view, God’s-eye perspectives—challenging viewers to critique the
visual story they are seeing as manufactured, however powerfully affecting. Moviegoers learn
that films do not reveal a world but construct one. And this knowledge empowers them to judge
the story being told and to question the images and worldview it projects.
Cinema’s play on the hermeneutics of seeing/knowledge and critique/judgment, parallel those of
the courtroom jury trial. As with film, the trial process is based on the believability and privileged
status of observable phenomena—on seeing, bearing witness, and judging. Also like film, legal
processes are self-reflexive. The essence of the trial is the existence of debatable stories, facts
that fit into conflicting versions of events, all being retold and represented for an audience asked
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to compare and judge their relative faithfulness to a past reality. Trials and their verdicts are
then themselves appealable and exposed to retellings that may have equal or greater
persuasive force. This process exposes law’s own fictions of determinacy and finality,
ideological commitments that political order requires.
Despite the contingencies of both legal and filmic accounts, both law and film are nonetheless
authoritative representational forms. Both are perceived to tell a particularly persuasive account
of “what happened” because they fortify the “knowledge” produced (a verdict or a filmic rendition
of an event) with the practice of first-person witnessing, reflexivity and self-critique, and the
accumulation and sorting of multiple perspectives. The recursive structure of legal judgments
makes room for the existence of hope and future change, an opportunity for those who may
experience exclusion to eventually be heard by those with power. This is critical for law’s
authority to bind its subjects and allows witnesses and jurors to accede to its dominion.
Similarly, film viewers enjoy the feeling of being (filmic) jurors and experiencing the confidence
of rendering the right verdict (or identifying the wrong one). Although many trial films are not
based on true stories, the stories told generally about law and its relationship to justice through
film nonetheless ring true for these same reasons.
The inherent affinity of film and law, grounded in shared storytelling strategies, may explain the
enduring popularity of the cinematic courtroom drama. As a genre, however, it has evolved over
the decades with our shifting cultural preoccupations and transforming sociopolitical relations. In
the early days of cinema, before sound, courtroom dramas were a kind of mystery genre,
unraveling the story of “whodunit” through a play of appearance and disappearance. Falsely
Accused!, a 1907 film, may be the first trial film, inaugurating the genre with particular themes
and structures that exist today. Falsely Accused! opens with the murder of an inventor and the
false accusation that his daughter committed the crime. The daughter’s boyfriend, inspecting the
crime scene, finds a motion picture camera, which was miraculously running during the
commission of the murder. He develops the film, revealing the true murderer, and rushes it to
the courthouse to show to the judge and jury. The revelatory experience of the film jury and the
film audience coincide—both “see” the evidence that reveals the truth of the defendant’s
innocence and the identity of the true murderer. That the missing piece of evidence is itself on
film strengthens the authority of and affinity between visual knowledge and legal knowledge.
And yet the film, as with the law, also gestures toward its constructedness by highlighting its
capacity for persuasive illusions (she was almost convicted after all), and its own partiality (the
“whole” story on film or in law is an impossibility). The self-reflexivity of Falsely
Accused! enables both a critique of film’s fictive nature and the expectation that film may be an
objective form of knowledge. Spectators understand that they are viewing a filmic point of
view and thus are invited to judge what they see. Thus, as early as 1907, film is both evidence
and a story of evidence, about the relationship between knowledge, justice and the
contingencies of both in the visual medium. The hundreds of trial films that follow contain similar
marks of the genre.
When the first person narrative form of filmmaking took hold in the 1920s and 1930s, before the
advent of sound or “talkies,” the trial film incorporated the omniscience of the film form with the
intimacy and subjectivity of the first-person protagonist. Interestingly, the collision of these two
perspectives became the well-known but nonetheless surprising “unreliable narrator”—the
feature of film storytelling that exposes the storyteller as untrustworthy. Recent examples of this
narrative feature in films about law and justice include The Usual Suspects (1995), Primal
Fear (1996), and Memento (2000). Rashomon (1950) by Akira Kurosawa is often cited as the
quintessential film about unreliable narrators as it features witnesses, victims, and accused
criminals telling the same story from diverging perspectives ending with a film viewer unsure
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who to believe. This feature of narrative film had its heyday in the early 1930s, between the two
world wars, when crime, poverty and the growing urbanization of America put pressure on the
promise of law and peaceful order. Fritz Lang’s M is one example from this period, a trial film
that features mob justice and organized crime replacing the judge and jury. The main character
appears to be an unsympathetic serial killer who, only at the end, is revealed to be mentally ill.
Neither the lawless mob nor the eventual courtroom trial effectively condemn or excuse the killer
because both are interrupted by interjections from the mothers of the victims who instead
condemn the bystanders who condone the violence and disorder around them. This is a nod to
the unraveling of Europe (the film was originally made in Germany and then brought to the
United States when its director emigrated shortly thereafter). It is also an explicit call for moral
responsibility of community members to each other.
Fritz Lang’s Fury (1936) repeats this style and structure. It stars Spencer Tracy as Joe, a
vigilante hero whose near death by an angry, arsonist crowd sews seeds of revenge, leading
him to plant evidence and frame the mob leaders for his “murder.” For a time, the film audience
believes that Joe perished in the arson. Newsreel footage accompanied by pictures of the
burning building and a terrifying shot of his face framed by a window engulfed in flames confirm
the protagonist’s demise. But then the audience sees him skulking around the edges of scenes,
manipulating the district attorney and conspiring with his brothers to assist in the conviction of
mob members for a crime that was never committed. As the film points to its own mode of
storytelling (visual evidence of past events) to undermine the truth of those stories (the visual
evidence misleads rather than clarifies) the audience becomes skeptical of other truth-telling
devices, such as the courtroom trial. Joe’s plot to use the legal system against his attackers and
pervert its promise of truth and justice, a plot that nearly succeeds until he relents and makes a
stunning entrance in the courtroom, reflects the problem of an unreliable protagonist, the
uncertainty built into all trial systems that rely on credibility determinations, and the inherent
opacity of the cinematic form. Norman Rosenberg describes the trial films from this time as “law
noir,” sharing features with “film noir,” a film style characterized by chiaroscuro elements and the
criminal underside of the postwar America (Rosenberg, 1994). These films criticize the law’s
capacity for truth (rejecting institutional order) and feature cowboylike heroes who take justice
into their own hands. These heroes do not inspire confidence because the justice they affect is
idiosyncratic and relies on rare or unusual acts of courage. And yet the legal system is no savior
either. Other trial films that share these features include the well-known Young Mr.
Lincoln (1939) by John Ford and The Paradine Case (1947).
Classical Hollywood style was an antidote to film noir (Bordwell, 1985, p. 370). In style and
substance the films of this time reflected a restoration that followed the Second World War and
featured heroes who work with the law rather than against it to right identifiable wrongs. Films of
this time, beginning with Adam’s Rib (1949) and continuing with Twelve Angry
Men (1957), Compulsion (1959), Inherit the Wind (1960), and To Kill a Mockingbird (1962),
created some of the most memorable and heroic lawyer characters on screen; these films also
launched hopeful commentaries about the off-screen American legal system as it was
dramatically evolving to more generously provide civil rights and civil liberties to all Americans.
In contrast to the skepticism that pervaded the representations of law in the 1930s and 1940s,
these later films portray a more hopeful vision of American law and justice. Adam’s Rib is a
groundbreaking film for women in the law and on screen at a time when equal rights for women
remained elusive. It is also one of the few comedic trial films of the time, featuring dueling
heroes as dueling lawyers (and spouses) arguing about the injustice of gendered roles and the
place of tradition in justifying legal rules. Twelve Angry Men glorifies the jury process and the
contribution of every man in our justice system. Compulsion, based on the Loeb and Leopold
case from 1924, develops the argument begun in Fury about mental health, criminal culpability,
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and retribution, featuring Orson Welles himself as Clarence Darrow, who appeals for mercy on
behalf of the defendants. Inherit the Wind, like Compulsion, is based on a true story and
embodies the American innovation of the separation of church and state and religious liberty. To
Kill a Mockingbird features Gregory Peck as Atticus Finch, who fights against insurmountable
odds for racial justice in the Jim Crow South. These films exemplify the political philosophy of
liberal legalism by rooting the promise of the American justice system in the determined and
enlightened individual, which contrasts with trial films of prior decades in which the legal-hero as
vigilante was an uncertain bet (Kamir, 2006, p. 115, 178). The difference between these civilrights era legal heroes and those from the law noir period is in their enduring commitment to
institutional change despite short-term setbacks. They portray the lawyer, juror, or witness who
is placated by participating in the legal system, recognizing that justice occurs in the aggregate
and over time as long as it is open to all. Despite alternative film styles during this same period,
Classical Hollywood (and the courtroom drama) dominated the film industry with its
“present[ation of] psychologically defined individuals as its principal causal agents” as Robert
Stam says, quoting film theorist Jean-Louis Baudry (Stam et al., 1992, pp. 186–87). Doing so, it
perpetuated the notion of the world (in and beyond film) as coherent and predictable, its
constructed reality based on the individual’s righteous participation and influence.
These patterns of American justice in trial films persist through the decades. Consider films from
the 1990s and 2000s, films such as A Civil Action (1998), Erin Brockovich (2000) or North
Country (2005). All are squarely in the Classical Hollywood tradition, their stories based upon
independent-minded, determined heroes who fight against long odds and whose skepticism of
law is undone by the filmic (and juridical) experience of truthful revelation at trial. These legal
heroes prevail in a tainted legal system by making a difference through their participation.
Consider also how many of these recent trial films are “based on a true story”: these are
docudramas that, when combined with the Classical Hollywood style, effectively perpetuate a
belief in the existence and power of this social justice advocate. And although many of these
films are not obviously self-reflexive in their film form, each film climaxes around a visual
revelation: a found document (The Verdict, Erin Brockovich), a testifying witness (A Civil Action),
or a discovered identity or hidden event (North Country). The film’s indices of “truth”—achieving
a just verdict through visual revelation and witnessing—furthers the film’s epistemological
authority as it tells a story of law through the visual sense. The truth told is both that seeing is
knowing, and as each viewer bears witness to law’s achievement of justice on film, that the
righteous participation of individuals is what is required.1

Common Themes and Scenes in Trial Films
The visual tropes in American trial films are familiar and consistent. They help build and sustain
the trial film genre as predictable for viewers, who learn to expect a certain satisfaction from the
climactic courtroom scene. For example, trial films typically open with an establishing shot of the
courthouse, its cupola, wide steps, and columns. Sometimes the film’s beginning contains
patriotic statues (Lady Liberty, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln) reminding the viewer of
national values that animate our legal system. The grand house of law resembles a house of
worship. It is both daunting and promising. It is also inviting. The camera usually pans up from a
street view, looking at the steps, to the courthouse or statue from a street perspective,
positioning the viewer as an eventual entrant and citizen in the house of law.
In contrast to these opening shots, the film scenes that follow inside the courthouse tend to be
more chaotic, animated by the bustle of people’s everyday business, crowded corridors and the
hum of paper and keyboards. The chaos foreshadows a problem in the house of law: disorder in
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need of fixing. Sometimes these further scenes infuse humanity into the otherwise
inanimateness of stone and metal—laughter and conversation, embraces and concerned
faces—a recognition that the promise of justice requires human intervention. Eventually, the
viewer reaches the courtroom, which may be shot symmetrically down the center focusing on
the flag or the judge, suggesting the promise of order to come; sometimes it is shot askew, with
a focus on the public attendees in the galley or a particular lawyer, suggesting there is work to
be done to reach a fair result. Either way, the opening frames of these trial films set up the
central dynamic of order and justice, law and institutions, everyday citizenship and lofty goals.
The core of the film focuses on evolving perspectives on a particular dispute between people
over events in the past. The film camera’s various perspectives in the courtroom accomplishes
at least three things. First, these positions invite and establish the authority of the film viewer to
judge the dispute and render a verdict. Inevitably at some point in the film, the camera will
position the viewer in the jury box, on the witness stand, behind the judge’s bench, or over the
shoulder of the trial attorney (all positions that are potent with critical decision-making duties).
The trial’s promise as a cohesive and satisfying process and the law’s promise of justice lie in
the confluence of these positions experienced by the film viewer. The experience is of the many
perspectives that culminate in a fair judgment manifested in a justifiable trial verdict.
Second, the camera cues the revelation of clandestine facts or relations from or between
characters in the film, facts and relations that once outed by the trial process enable a just
conclusion. By framing the film’s character in a single head shot, for example, and then cutting
swiftly from one character to another, the camera discloses psychic relationships between the
thoughts, lives, and situations of the featured persons, encouraging the viewer to understand
the connections as relevant for the trial at hand. This kind of relational composition is common
in films as a suturing device, but in trial films these technical devices contrast with the inhuman
and inanimate beginnings of law (buildings, statues, and flags). Now filled with faces, often
close-ups of emotional expressions and gestures, the house of law is imbued with the
significance of individual human lives as represented by the uncovered relationships between
people in the house of law.
Finally, the camera also acts as a perspective lens, zooming and reverse zooming, panning and
rotating, providing a sense of coherence and omniscience within the courtroom able to see the
situation from diverse angles. The camera here represents the ideal of justice—providing
distance for objectivity, close-ups for intimacy and emotion, zoom shots for pointed
commentary—in order to evaluate the case from all possible positions and to put the problem in
an objective light. The camera is not mimicking the human eye as a witness but as a machine
and an institution, without personal bias or desire but programmed objectivity, historical
memory, and the patience of time. In this way, the ideal of justice is a combination of the
human, technological, and institutional.
Trial films usually have one of two possible endings. The first is that the legal process forces the
revelation of a secret truth that enables justice to be done. This happened in the first trial
film Falsely Accused! when the film camera reveals the murderer, in Fury when Joe presents
himself to the court at this own murder trial, in The Verdict when a witness breaks down and
admits to changing the number on a form, and in A Few Good Men when Daniel Caffy
effectively cross-examines Colonel Jessup who admits to ordering the hazing of a marine. Like
a puzzle piece gone missing, the legal process and the trial help put everything back together,
perpetuating law’s reputation as a means toward revelation of and judgment on the whole truth.
The other possible ending is a disappointment of justice, when the trial process frustrates the
search for truth, not because it is unknown to the audience but because the law cannot or will
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not accommodate it. These films end with a sense that law is ever present but flawed and that
audiences acquiesce to it, because what choice do they have? In these films, viewers are left
with hope that another time and a new hero may succeed where the present has failed.
Intriguingly, viewers are not left with anarchic thoughts or cursing the impossibility of justice,
because they have been taught through the film to identify right from wrong and the difference
between the abuse and justifiable use of power. The films suggest that the failings are
temporary and that change is eventually possible within the bounds of the law.
Most trial films are in the first category, glorifying the legal process as an ultimate arbiter of truth
and justice. Twelve Angry Men is an often cited as a quintessential example of this genre
(although to be sure the film did not expose guilt or innocence only the frailty of the
prosecution’s case) (Marder, 2007). A Civil Action is an example of the latter category, where
the fallen hero-attorney fails to win the case against the companies who contaminate drinking
water and cause leukemia deaths. A Civil Action identifies the wrongdoers, characterizing them
as evil and greedy. But the trial lawyer fails in court to prove culpability. Nonetheless, although
the lawsuit does not end with a liability judgment, we learn later than an Environmental
Protection Agency investigation does. The plaintiffs do not get justice in a court of law, but the
wrongdoers were eventually punished (albeit off screen and in a postscript). In both trial film
narratives, the audience becomes aware of the truth either at the end of the trial or despite it. In
the latter case, the issue is not who did it and why but whether the law will eventually account
for the truth, as a well-functioning justice system should. In both narratives, the law is an
endlessly recursive and discursive practice. It is omnipresent and perpetual despite whether or
not individual cases always right identifiable wrongs. This is not a representation of law as
tyrannical but of a society that cannot imagine sustainable human civilization and ordered liberty
without law, even if it sometimes fails the viewer’s sense of justice. It is a rare courtroom drama
whose message is truth at all costs, even anarchy (e.g., foregoing law for self-help or other
kinds of retribution). And it is even a rarer courtroom drama in which the legal system lacks any
redeeming qualities. These two narratives in trial films represent the dominant representation of
law and justice. Together they constitute and sustain the ideology of the rule of law as a key
principle that serves and is serviced by the everyday citizen.

Trial Films as Truth Tales
Although many trial films are based on true stories, the docudrama or reality television
courtroom series has become a popular trend. Even in prior decades, trial films based on fact
were wildly popular. Consider Young Mr. Lincoln (1939), Anatomy of a
Murder (1959), Compulsion (1959), Inherit the Wind (1960), Helter Skelter, (1976), The
Verdict (1982), Reversal of Fortune (1990) In the Name of the Father (1993), A Cry in the Dark
(1998), and North Country (2005) to name a few. Films that resemble documentaries
include Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robinhood Hills (2000), The Staircase, Murder on
a Sunday Morning (2001), Capturing the Friedmans (2003). And recent television series based
on court cases include Making a Murderer (2015), The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert
Durst (2015), and People v. O.J. Simpson (2016). This subset of trial films is not necessarily
popular because they are based on fact (although that is surely part of the attraction), but
because they exemplify since the birth of cinema the central ties that bind filmic worldmaking to
legal worldmaking: by relying on the incontrovertibility of observations from testifying witnesses
(viewers) to tell stories, they simultaneously convince audiences that no story is undeniable.
And yet, the overwhelming influence of both cinema and law in our culture is that each claim to
narrate the definitive story.
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These trial films based on true stories, or “truth tales,” often contain documentary features—
black and white footage, handheld cameras, first-person narratives, and interviews in the style
of investigatory journalism. These features index informational and factual transparency, the
purpose of which is to cultivate the viewer’s trust regarding the film’s truth value. But theorists of
documentary film explain how these formal features say nothing about the inherent truth of the
film’s narrative (Nichols, 1992, pp. 32–33). These features are well-recognized codes whose
purpose is to tell the viewer that the film is based on fact, despite the contextualization of the
facts that produce variations of the depictions of the historical event. Moreover, when the truth
tales are based on well-known or knowable historical trials, their focus is not on “whodunit” or
the discovery of a long-sought piece of evidence to confirm the legal verdict or exonerate the
defendant. These are famous stories with famous endings. Instead, these truth tales
demonstrate the inevitability of multiple stories that explain or describe a past event, even one
that culminates in a legal trial whose goal is to render accurate and just judgments about the
truth of what happened. In this way, truth tales are a kind legal appeal, recharacterizing past
events in a new light or demonstrating the relevance of past trials for present times.
Be they documentaries or films based on true stories, “truth tales,” are already self-conscious in
form and content of the undeniable fictiveness of all stories and of law’s conspiratorial role in
crafting them. This urges the audience not to ask what they know about the characters and their
history from film (as tell-all films promise and trials as adjudicative processes must) but instead
to question the diverse and controversial role of law in perpetuating certain stories over others.
These trial films about true stories are not about revealing a truth (whatever that may be) but
instead are about the production of truths through law as merely temporary resting places for
trial verdicts, constellations in the process audiences learn to respect as the rule of law.
The truth tale’s cultivated expectation of historical accuracy through its documentary features,
when combined with its self-consciously fictive form, produces a film viewer and a legal citizen
who hopes for but feels free to critique the legal process that promises justice. This viewercitizen is made aware of historical and cultural contingencies that limit law’s application. As time
passes and stories accumulate about the same case (be it O. J. Simpson, or Leopold and
Loeb), the legal verdict loses its significance as the “final word” on the matter at issue and
instead viewers become comfortable with messier and more open accounts of history. The
audience to multiple versions of the same story understands that law is not a teleological
system (its goal being the uncovering of the truth each side is fighting over) but a pragmatic
process motivated by contemporary and often contradictory circumstances that change over
time. Although these truth tales initially cultivate a desire for exposure and discovery based on
the ideological correlation in film and law between truth and perception, the self-conscious form
of the film and the law as portrayed through each enables the audience to critique the desire for
certainty and truth. Audiences of truth tales can say they know only what the film constructs and
that the law is the same. While audiences appreciate the rule of law’s requirement for static
verdicts at specific moments, truth tales that are trial films reveal the changing significance of
legal verdicts through time.
Ultimately then, trial films generally and truth tales specifically are about the difficulty and duty of
judging. The roots of early film exist in even the most recent of legal docudramas—the unity of
sight and knowledge (an issue of evidence and knowledge production) and of being seen and
counted (an issue of subjectivity and the ideological importance of each individual participant).
The authority of law and film is based mainly on these strategies of reflexivity that recuperate
criticism of their contingent form and portray the future as open to opportunities for inclusion.
While both film and law rely on the incontrovertible observations from testifying witnesses (or
viewers) who tell their stories, these stories that purport to be documentary or authentic
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renderings of real events manage to convince their audiences that all stories are particular and
no story is incontestable (Silbey, 2007). As such, these truth tales sustain the authority of law as
made and remade by those who subject themselves to it—an evolving process of ordering that
functions because viewers participate in it. In other words, popular cultural renderings of law
serve the dominion of the rule of law itself.

The Future of Trial Films
In the 21st century, cameras in the courtroom and digital access to courtroom proceedings have
flourished. Narrative forms of legal stories have also remained popular. Consider the
podcast Serial (2014), a spin-off of nationally broadcast This American Life radio show, about
the true case of convicted murder Adnan Syed whose trial in the year 2000 was riddled with
ethical and legal problems (Raptopoulos, 2014). The podcast was one of the first podcasts to be
national; it was widely popular across the United States and has been downloaded over 80
million times (Mallenbaum, 2015). In addition to retelling the story of the murder investigation
and trial, the podcast is a meta-commentary on the ability of any story to tell a definitive account
of past events when faulty memory and conflicting experiences are inevitable and when forensic
evidence is subject to interpretation. Co-creator Sarah Koenig describes the format “as old as
Dickens” (Raptopoulos, 2014) and yet when Serial won the Peabody Award in 2015, Director of
the Peabody Awards Jeffrey Jones exclaimed that the podcast showed “how new avenues and
approaches to storytelling can have a major impact on how audiences understand truth, reality
and events.” (Mullin, 2015) Director Jones’s comment may be true about internet podcasts in
particular, but it is not true as regards narrative forms concerning law and justice over the past
hundred years. Questioning the possibility of telling “the definitive story” for the purpose of legal
authority and justice is precisely what courtroom dramas have been doing since their inception
in the early 1900s.
Likewise, the wide acceptance of news cameras in the courtroom and the proliferation of citizen
journalism (e.g., blogs and Twitter accounts) facilitates more discussion and debate about
current legal affairs. Many law blogs are not only for lawyers, law students, or legal researchers
but, as posts and comments thereto demonstrate, are geared toward everyday citizens with
interest in particular cases, events, claims of injustice, or law reform.2 As the American Bar
Association Journal reports, law blogs have “democratized information” (McDonough, 2015).
When the information is about law, the democratization expands the perceptions of negotiated
control and authority as between local, state, and federal governments and each individual
subject to the legal system.
The future of the representations of justice in film, and of the courtroom drama in particular, can
be best understood by studying cinema’s history, form, and capacity to shape our expectations
of ourselves and our community through imagination and reflection. More generally, the future
of law and popular culture requires understanding how stories and accounts of people’s lives
and communities make sense to and mobilize social and political movements. Art and politics
have always been intertwined. The American trial film is one particular intertwining that focuses
on the courtroom proceeding and the everyday citizen’s role in affecting justice through it.
We often ask of law whether it succeeds at judging and organizing society. We ask: “Is this law
good?” or “Does this law work as intended?” A way of judging law’s success is if instead of
dominance and oppression law’s application is understandable and honorable in its distribution
of benefits and burdens. As Lief Carter and Tom Burke have written, “[T]he whole point of the
rule of law is to set standards of governance that transcend individual moral feelings” (Carter &
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Burke, 2007, p. 3). A central question of legal reasoning therefore is not whether everyday
people like the result law provides but whether the reasons provided for the result make the best
sense. Good stories make good sense. The law will rarely make good sense when relying on
formal logic or legal reasoning instead of recognizable and moving narrative forms.
To be sure, popular cultural stories are not more ethically upstanding than law is inevitably
oppressive (Brooks & Gewirtz, 1998, p. 16). Both stories and law act on us. Both constitute us
as subjects, shaping our expectations and desires, implicating us in the moral points made.
“Narratives do not stand outside social authority—they are part of it” (Binder & Weisberg, 2000,
p. 23). One only needs to explore the reaction to popular stories such as Serial—which has led
to a post-conviction hearing for the defendant decades after his last appeal (Phillip, 2015)—as
evidence of how stories effect social and political change. By studying stories and the diversity
of story forms—through film, literature, television, the internet—we understand how consumers
and audiences are worked on and how they might work on others by and through culture. Law’s
result—be it a verdict, a penalty, a loss of life or liberty—may feel different in kind than an effect
of a popular story told in film or elsewhere; however, the point is that the way they both
legitimate their force is through rhetorical persuasion. Both can liberate or oppress. When the
stories are legal stories their power is at an apex.
Courtroom dramas and other popular legal stories are as effective a form of political mobilization
today as any form of political literature and art through the ages. Stories situate us in culture and
communities. A good story does more: it involves its audience and brings them along to
participate in—even embrace—its conclusion. “Literature is, like law, an arena of strategic
conflict” (Binder & Weisberg, 2000, p. 19). Cultural critics and social justice advocates must
attend to the appropriation and reconfiguration that law and popular culture accomplish as part
of their mutually dependent reasoning (Id, p. 27). Alert to historical truths, to “unauthored myths
or stereotypes that circulate through culture like . . . contagion” (Id., p. 23), to the audience
members who command attention and power and in whom the story lives and grows, stories
(narrative reasoning) “organiz[e] and speak[] the world” (Id., p. 14). So in asking whether the law
succeeds—whether it is good—we are also necessarily asking whether the story it tells is good,
whether its reasoning accounts to and for us, and whether the world it calls into being is one we
could comfortably inhabit. This is a question that concerned most courtroom dramas and early
popular renderings of law and legal proceedings. It would be surprising if the future of popular
cultural legal forms, especially the American trial film and its variations in mass media, deviated
from this dominant tradition. Building awareness of the law’s power to tell definitive stories of
guilt or innocence, truth or justice, these popular stories also empower their audiences to be
critics of unreasoned oppression and to constitute themselves as engaged citizens with the
opportunity to shape the law’s reach.

Review of the Literature and Disciplinary Approach
The study of law and popular culture explores ways in which law is a discursive practice and a
form of rhetoric that constitutes a community of speakers and listeners (White, 1984, 1990;
Johnson & Buchanan, 2001). As a discipline it disclaims the autonomy of law and recognizes
that law’s power is best understood as deriving from its fact of being situated within (or as part
of) contemporary culture.
The study of law and popular culture has its roots in other interdisciplinary legal studies, such as
law and history, law and economics, law and philosophy—each of which helped legitimize the
idea of the interdisciplinary of law itself (Silbey, 2002). The study of law and popular culture has
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strong roots in the law and literature movement. As an infant, the study of law and literature was
the study of representations of law in “great books,” the subfield that has become known as
“law-in-literature” (Id., p. 141). Law-in-literature analyzes literary texts, such as Dostoyevsky’s
Crime and Punishment or Herman Melville’s Billy Budd, for how these texts describe law
(Weisberg, 1984, 1988). As a content analysis, law-in-literature is distinct from law-as-literature,
which is a study of discursive persuasion and the constitution of a community through language
(Silbey, 2002, p. 146; Levinson, 1982). Pioneers of the law-as-literature movement include
James Boyd White, whose seminal books in the field describes law as an art that is literary and
rhetorical in nature, a way of establishing meaning and constituting community in language. By
“rhetoric,” White means
the study of the ways in which character and community—and motive, value,
reason, social structure, everything, in short, that makes a culture—are defined
and made real in performances of language . . . As the object of art is beauty and
of philosophy truth, the object of rhetoric is justice: the constitution of a social
world.
(White, 1984, p. xi)
As White’s work emphasizes, studying law as a discursive practice that constitutes a community
is a study of social relations. Too often, the cultural analysis of law—law in or as literature, for
example—omits the analysis of the subject of law, the citizen on which law acts and who acts
on behalf of it. Locating the construction of that citizen in the text (as an effect of
representational practice) or through the text (as a result of reception theory) emphasizes the
political nature of all cultural production.
Cultural studies scholars tend to divide their analysis into the study of production, reception and
representation (Johnson, 1986–1987). They may investigate the means by which a cultural
object is produced, the ways in which an object is perceived and operationalized by its
audience, and the manner in which it may be interpreted based on its particular formal structure
(Ibid.). Thinking about the interdisciplinary endeavor of law and culture in these terms—these
three points in the transmission, circulation, and exchange of cultural form—helps to address
several weaknesses in the interdisciplinary field of law and popular culture, especially as it has
grown and aspired to achieve the epistemological goals listed above.
Studies of law and popular culture sometimes fail to demarcate the terms of analysis. Both “law”
and “culture” are ubiquitous terms in the literature and require definition for a methodologically
appropriate beginning to any investigation. Law and literature scholars typically explore law as a
language embodying and animating text, a distinct set of cultural practices that can be studied
for their formal qualities and communicative and material effects. But law is, of course, much
more than that (Silbey, 2002, p. 147). The nature of interdisciplinarity itself, to say nothing of the
study of law and popular culture specifically, demands careful attention to the designation of
subject matter under analysis. Demarcating terms and attending to the analytic methodologies
of the disciplines from which to draw (including, for example, a focus on one of the modalities of
cultural analysis described above: production, reception or representation) can foster productive
and innovative scholarship.
The discipline of law and film is itself a subfield of law and popular culture. There are law and
film scholars who are primarily concerned with the ways in which law and legal processes are
represented in film, what might be analogized to “law-in-film” scholars (Chase, 2002; Denvir,
1996; Friedman, 1989). Exploring the contours of law and legal questions in film resembles
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more familiar jurisprudential debates about how law should or should not regulate and order our
worlds by critiquing the way it does so in the film (Kamir, 2006). There are also law and film
scholars who investigate how law films constitute a legal culture beyond the film (i.e., how films’
peculiar ways of world making shape our expectations of law and justice in our world at large)
(Lucia, 2005; Silbey, 2001; Rosenberg, 1994). Some of these law and film scholars pay
particular attention to film’s visual embodiment of legal discourse in culture, focusing on the
technology of the moving image (as opposed to the written text) as a uniquely powerful way of
telling stories and creating (or sustaining) particular aspects of social relations (Lucia, 2005;
Black, 1999). Other scholars focus on the way in which film, like law, is a means through which
communities form and pass judgment, law being a process of judgment and film being a
medium through which audiences are subconsciously made to judge the film characters and
their actions (Kamir, 2006; Mnookin, 2005). In these latter approaches, fairly analogized to a
film-as-law approach, film and law are compared as epistemological systems, formidable social
practices that, when combined, are exceptionally effective in defining what audiences think they
know, what they believe they should expect, and what they hope for in a society that promises
ordered liberty.
The film-as-law approach to a cultural analysis of law through film engages most directly with a
cultural studies methodology. Generally, the discipline of film studies approaches the institution
of cinema in light of its history and its formal attributes. The history of cinema includes its history
of production, circulation, and reception, all of which film scholars consider crucial to interpreting
film texts and understanding film’s role in society. The study of film’s formal qualities (features of
representation and production) would include attention to individual film’s narrative arc, casting
choices, visual patterns, and camera techniques as a way of interpreting the individual text and
its place in a canon of like films (film genre). As discussed above in terms of the American trial
film, the analysis of film as a cultural object, especially when about legal procedure and justice,
helps explain how a film’s audience and community (a feature of reception) participate in and
sustain particular ideas and ideologies about law.

Links to Digital Sources
Digital sources on the Loeb-Leopold case include the following four websites:
Famous Trials in American History.
University Archives.
Leopold and Loeb—Homicide in Chicago 1870–1930.
Introduction—Exhibit: Law in Popular Culture. (digital collection of law and lawyers in
popular culture)

Filmography/Media References
A Cry in the Dark (Dir. Fred Shepisi, 1988).
Anatomy of a Murder (Dir. Otto Preminger, 1959).
Capturing the Friedmans (Dir. A. Jarecki, 2003).
Compulsion (Dir. Richard Fleischer, 1959).
Falsely Accused! (Dir. D.W. Griffith, 1907).
Helter Skelter (Dir. Tom Gries, 1976).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3151795

In the Name of the Father (Dir. Jim Sheridan, 1993).
Inherit the Wind (Dir. Stanley Kramer, 1960).
The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst (Dir. Andrew Jarecki, Marc Smerling, and
Zachary Stuart-Pontie, 2015).
Making a Murderer (Dir. Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos, 2015).
Murder on a Sunday Morning (Dir. J-X de Lestrade, 2001).
North Country, (Dir. Niki Caro, 2005).
Paradine Case (Dir. Alfred Hitchcock, 1948).
Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robinhood Hills (Dir. J. Berlinger and B. Sinofsky, 2000).
People v. O.J. Simpson (Dir. Scott Alexander and Larry Karaszewski, 2016).
Reversal of Fortune (Dir. Barbet Schroeder, 1990).
Serial (Dir. Sarah Koenig and Julie Snyder, 2014–2015).
The Staircase (Dir. J-X de Lestrade, 2004).
Twelve Angry Men (Dir. Sidney Lumet, 1949).
Young Mr. Lincoln (Dir. John Ford, 1939).
The Verdict (Dir. Sidney Lumet, 1980).
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Notes:
(1.) Of course this ideological effect of the trial film, like any ideology, is not monolithic but full of
fissures. In fact, film’s ubiquitous self-reflexive tendencies (telling stories through pictures about
telling stories through pictures) can be a way both to comment on its illusion by pointing to its
constructedness and provide a mode of resistance to the “myth of total cinema,” as cinema
theorist Andre Bazin has described it (Bazin, 1967, pp. 23–27).
(2.) For a list of the 2016 Blawg 100 Hall of Fame awarded by the American Bar Association
and links to the law blogs,
see http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/2013_blawg_100_hall_of_fame.
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